Admission of Illegally Obtained Evidence by Marchant, John B.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 5 | Issue 2 Article 11
1-1954
Admission of Illegally Obtained Evidence
John B. Marchant
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
John B. Marchant, Admission of Illegally Obtained Evidence, 5 Hastings L.J. 227 (1954).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol5/iss2/11
ADMISSION OF ILLGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE
By JOHN B. MARCHANT
The common law is well settled that evidence otherwise admissible will
not be excluded from a trial because it was illegally acquired.1 Within the
last half century this rule has often been questioned in California with re-
spect to evidence obtained in derogation of the accused's constitutional
rights.2 The favorite objections of counsel to such evidence are (1) that it
was obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Cali-
fornia Constitution;8 (2) that it violates the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion,' and (3) that its admission is a violation of the due process clause.5
However, except in cases involving due process the California courts have
rejected these objections. In so holding they have adopted the common law
rule, the reason for which Professor Wigmore has aptly stated as follows:
"A judge does not hold court in a street-car to do summary justice upon
a fellow passenger who fraudulently evades payment of his fare; and, upon
the same principle, he does not attempt, in the course of a specific litigation
to investigate and punish all offenses which incidentally cross the path of that
litigation."16
Evidence Obtained by an Unreasonable Search and Seizure.
Both the United States and California constitutions guarantee the right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.' The federal courts ex-
clude evidence obtained in violation of this provision8 provided the party
making the objection is the owner9 of the property illegally seized, he has
1f GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 254 (3d ed. 1899) "Though papers and other subjects of evidence
may have been illegally taken from the possession of the party against whom they are offered, or
otherwise unlawfully obtained, this is no valid objection to their admission if they are pertinent to
the issue. The courts will not take notice how they were obtained, whether lawfully or unlawfully,
nor will it frame an issue to determine that question"; WiGmorm, Pocc ET CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule
197 (1910) : "An evidential fact, otherwise admssible, is not excluded: (1) Because it had been
obtained by means of some violation of Law, (2) nor because its existence is attended with some
violation of Law."
2Weeks v. United States, 332 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). "The tendency of those who execute the
criminal laws of fis country to obtain convictions by means of unlawful seizures and enforced con-
fessions . . should find no sanction in the judgment of the courts, wich are charged at all tnies
with the support of the Constitution and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal
for the maintenance of such fundamental rights."
'CALIF. Co Nsr. Art. I, § 19.
'CALIF. CON sT. Art. I, § 3.
1U. S. Coisr. AmEND. XIV, § 1.
8WIMrmoE, EVIDENCE § 2183 (3d ed. 1940).
'See note 3 supra; U. S. CONST. AMEND. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated. . '
'Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1920) ; Weeks v. United States, supra note 2; Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1895).
'Brooks v. United States, 8 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1925) ; United States v, Murray, 17 F.2d 276
(N.D. Cal. 1927).
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made a timely motion for the return of his property"0 and the evidence was
seized by federal officers." Before the turn of the century the California
courts adopted the common law rule that illegality in obtaining evidence does
not affect its admissibility,'12 but it was not until 1922 that the California
Supreme Court considered the conflict between the common law and the
federal rule.
In People v. Mayen" the defendant had been found guilty of grand
larceny. Certain evidence introduced at the trial was Mayen's property which
had been seized by police officers under a defective search warrant. Shortly
before the trial Mayen had made an appropriate motion for the return of his
property, but his motion and objection'to its use as evidence were denied. The
District Court of Appeal 4 reversed the conviction holding that there had been
an unreasonable search and seizure and the timely motion for return of the
property entitled him to its exclusion as evidence. By holding that evidence
obtained in violation of article I, section 19, was inadmissible, the court
elected to apply a rule of evidence analogous to that employed by the federal
courts.
The California Supreme Court reversed the the District Court of Ap-
peal, holding that illegally obtained evidence should be admitted. The fact
that it had been procured in violation of the Constitution was held not to
affect its probative value so as to justify exclusion. The court pointed out
that there were adequate remedies, both civil and crimmal, 5 to redress a
violation of Mayen's rights without injecting the issue of the officers' wrong-
doing into a litigation concerning an unrelated matter. Any remedial action,
it said, should be separate and distinct from the trial to which the evidence
is relevant.
For twenty years thereafter the California courts applied this rule to
situations involving searches and seizures without warrants, under defective
"Rochin v. United States, 78 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1935), Bell v. United States, 9 F.2d 820 (9th
Cir. 1925)
"Symons v. United States, 178 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1950), Herine v. United States, 276 Fed.
a06 (9th Cir. 1921), Gambro v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927) (where a state officer seizes
evidence on behalf of federal officers, it is inadmissible in a federal court), 11 CALIF. L. REv. 246
(1927)
"People v. Le Doux, 155 Cal. 535, 102 Pac. 517 (1909) , People v. Allen, 113 Cal. 264, 45 Pac.
372 (1896), People v. Warren, 12 Cal.App. 730, 108 Pac. 725 (1910), People v. Swaile, 12 CaLApp.
192, 107 Pac. 134 (1909)
"188 Cal. 237, 205 Pac. 435 (1922) See Grant, Searches and Seizures in California, 15 So.
CALIF. L. REV. 139 (1942), (detailed discussion and criticism of the case.)
"49 Cal.App. 314, 193, Pac. 173 (1920).
"CALIF. PEN. CODE § 146 (1953) "Officer Acting Without Regular Process, Every Public
officer who, under the pretense or color of any process or other legal authority, arrests any
person or detains him against his will, or seizes or levies upon any property without a regular
process or other lawful authority therefore, is guilty of a misdemeanor", see 38 CALIF. L. REv. 498,
502 (1950), (Discussion of Criminal and Civil Remedies for an Unreasonable Search and Seizure
in California)
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warrants and to trespasses to the accused's property.1" In 1942 the Supreme
Court re-examined its position on the admissibility question in People v.
Gonzales. 7 Here the defendants Gonzales and Chierotti had been marketing
a "money making machine." One of these machines had been seized in the
defendant's home by police officers who had no search warrant and was ad-
mitted as evidence at the trial for grand theft. The defendants sought reversal
on the ground of article I, section 19. The court reaffirmed the rule that the
procurement of evidence by an unreasonable search and seizure and its ad.
missibility in evidence are separate and unrelated questions.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Carter presented a strong plea for adopt-
ing the exclusionary rule in California. He argued that the effectiveness of
any constitutional right is dependent upon the existence of adequate remedies
to enforce that right, and that the prohibition of unlawful acts by agents of
government is one of the major objectives of the provisions relating to unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. Further, he said, the only effective way to
prevent these acts is to render the fruits of the wrongdoing useless in a court
of law. He concluded that the majority's holding rendered article I, section
19, a "bare abstraction" and failing to provide an adequate remedy the court
was depriving its citizens of their rights.
To the proponents of the common law and the California rule there are
three reasons for rejecting the exclusionary rule. First, it is an attempt to
try an offense without the normal process and complaint against the wrong-
doer. Second, it is a remedy which does not punish the wrongdoer but gratu-
itously aids another to whose guilt or innocence the violation of the Consti-
tution is immaterial. Finally, it is a remedy that interferes with the adminis-
tration of justice by burdening the courts with an issue wholly independent
of the question before the court." The arguments for this conclusion are
marshalled by Professor Wigmore, to whom the federal rule is "misguided
sentimentality." He satirizes what he believes to be the manifest folly of the
rule as follows:
"Titus, you have been found guilty of conducting a lottery; Flavius, you
have confessedly violated the constitution. Titus ought to suffer imprisonment
for crime, and Flavius for contempt. But no! We shall let you both go free.
We shall not punish Flavius directly, but shall do so by reversing Titus'
conviction. This is our way of teaching people like Flavius to behave, and
16Henscher v. State Bar of California, 4 Cal.2d 399, 49 P.2d 832 (1935), Ex Parte Polinzzoto,
188 Cal. 410, 205 Pac. 676 (1922) ; People v. Richardson, 83 CalApp. 302, 256 Pac. 616 (1927),
cert. denied, 276 U.S. 615 (1927) ; People v. Eiseman, 78 CalApp. 223, 248 Pac. 716 (1926), cert.
denied, 273 U.S. 663 (1926).
1120 Cal.2d 165, 124 P.2d 44 (1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 657 (1942).
"5Recent California cases have continued to follow this view. See People v. Allen, 115 Cal.App.2d
745, 252 P.2d 968 (1953); People v. Garcia, 97 CaLApp.2d 733, 218 P.2d 837 (1950); People v.
Harmon, 89 CaLApp.2d 55, 200 P.2d 32 (1948), People v. Jackson, 80 CaLApp.2d 386, 181 P.2d
889 (1947).
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of teaching people like Titus to behave, and incidentally of securing respect
for the Constitution. Our way of upholding the Constitution is not to strike
at the man who breaks it but to let off somebody who broke something
else."' 19
The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination.
It is well settled in California that a person has a right to refuse to give
evidence, under oath, which might tend to incriminate him. s" It is equally
well settled that the admission of evidence obtained from the possession of
the accused by an unreasonable search is not a violation of the privilege
against self-incrimination.2' However, recent cases have raised the question
whether the privilege applies when the evidence was obtained by a trespass
to the person of the accused.
People v. One 1941 Mercury Sedan"2 was an action by the state for-
feiture of an automobile used to transport narcotics. Police officers ap-
prehended the defendant while he was in possession of narcotics, but before
they could seize the narcotics he swallowed them. The defendant was taken to
a hospital where the narcotics were recovered with a stomach pump. The
state offered the narcotics as evidence, and the defendant objected that their
admission would violate his privilege against self-incrimination. This objec-
tion was sustained and the trial court gave judgment for the defendant.
The District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court holding the privi-
lege did not apply to this evidence. The court pointed out that the privilege
was designed as a protection against inquisitorial proceedings where a person
could be required to give evidence under oath. The essential element is that
the probative value of the evidence must depend upon oath of the accused.
Where the evidence elicited consists of a physical object, probative value is
not involved and the privilege is therefore inapplicable.23
In cases involving the admissibility of the result of a blood test, where
the blood was taken without the consent of the accused, the California courts
have uniformly held that the evidence is not within the scope of the privilege.
In People v. Tucker 4 the District Court of Appeals applied this rule, and in
People v. Heussler25 the California Supreme Court reached a similar conclu-
sion. Thus the California courts have refused to apply the broad interpreta-
'"8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2184 (3d ed. 1940)
"0CALIF. CONST. Art. I, § 3; CALIF. PEN. CODE § 1323 (1953) "A defendant in a criminal action
or proceeding cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself ", CALIF. CODE CIV. PROC.
§ 2065: "A witness . . need not give an answer which will have a tendency to subject him to
punishment for a felony. "
2 People v. Mayen, supra note 13.
"74 Cal.App.2d 199, 168 P.2d 443 (1946)
2"8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2264 (3d ed. 1940)
i488 Cal.App.2d 333, 198 P.2d 941 (1949) ; see also 22 So. CALIF. L. REV. 483 (1949)
2541 A.C. 256, 260 P.2d 8 (1953)
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tion of the privilege advocated by some authorities, that the accused should
never be required to be a party to the obtaining of incriminating evidence. 6
Due Process: The Rochin Case.
In Wolf v. Colorado7 the United States Supreme Court held' although
an unreasonable search and seizure by state officers was a violation of the due
process clause, that admission in a state court of evidence thereby obtained
was not repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment. The basic distinction made
was that while the state can not affirmatively invade the right which is a
part of due process, once that right has been violated the question of admis-
sibility becomes one of enforcement of the right rather than a second viola-
tion of the Constitution. The Court held that the issue of whether the exclu-
sionary rule applied by the federal courts was a proper remedy was open to
"the varying solutions which spring from an allowable range of judgment
on issues not susceptible of quantitative solution.
' 28
Three years later in Roclhn v. California9 the Supreme Court held that
the admission of evidence obtained in such an arbitrary manner as to "shock
the conscience" was a violation of the due process clause. In this case police
officers, suspecting Rochin of illegally possessing narcotics, raided his home
without a search warrant. When they entered his house there were two cap-
sules on a table, but before they could be seized, Rochin swallowed them. The
officers sought to prevent this by forcing open his mouth, but were unsuccess-
ful. Thereupon they took him to a hospital where he was given a solution
which caused him to regurgitate the capsules, which were found to be mor-
phine. Since.Rochin was not cooperative, the police applied considerable
force. On the strength of the evidence thus obtained Rochin was convicted.
The District Court of Appeal,3" in affirming Rochin's conviction, applied the
California rule stated in the Mayen and Gonzales cases. It said that although
the officers had committed an unreasonable search and seizure, a false im-
prisonment and an assault and battery, the morphine so acquired was ad
missible.
The United States Supreme Court reversed Rochin's conviction holding
that the admission of this evidence was a violation of the due process clause.
While the Court recognized that state courts have the primary responsibility
for administering justice within their own jurisdictions, it held that the Four-
teenth Amendment gave it a collateral power of review to prevent the state
courts and law enforcement agencies from transgressing the "canons of de-
'See the dissenting opinion of Schauer, J., in People v. Rochm, 225 P.2d 913 (1951). Compare
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 205 (1952) : "No person has a privilege . . to refuse . . (b) to
furnish or permit the taking of body flird or substances for analysis."
21338 U.S. 25 (1949).
'8 Id. at 28.
29342 U.S. 165 (1952).
"See note 26 supra.
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cency and fairness" implicit in the due process clause." The Court reviewed
the record of the chain of events leading up to the introduction of the evi-
dence and conviction of Rochin, and said:
" We are compelled to conclude that the proceedings by which this
conviction was obtained do more than offend some fastidious squeamishness
of private sentimentalism about combatting crime too energetically This is
conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking into the privacy of the
defendant, the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the
forcible extraction of his stomach's contents-This course of proceedings by
agents of governments to obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened
sensibilities. They are methods too close to the rack and screw to permit of
constitutional di§erentiation."3 2 (Emphasis added.)
The Court made an analogy between this type of evidence and evidence
consisting of a coerced confession, the admission of which the Court had held
in an earlier decision," is a violation of due process. The use of these types
of evidence, the Court held, was repugnant to the community's sense of de-
cency and Justice. It said:
"It would be a stultification of responsibility . to hold that in
order to convict a man the police cannot extract by force what is in his mind
but can extract by force what is in his stomach." '34
To extract a precise rule from this case is impossible. The Court pointed
out that by its very nature due process could not be reduced to a mechanical
certainty, but rather it is "derived from considerations that are found in the
whole nature of our judicial process."35 It considers due process as a concept
constantly changing and evolving within the environment of present-day so-
ciety. The Court did not deny the power of the state courts to admit evidence
obtained through an infringement of the accused's constitutional rights as
had been held in the Wolf case. However, the Court did limit this power by
declaring a judicial veto where it becomes apparent that the agents of the
state have so exceeded the bounds of fair play and justice as to shock "even
the most hardened sensibilities."
In People v. Kendall 6 the defendant objected on the basis of the Rochin
case to the admission of evidence seized in his office by officers who had a
warrant to search only his home. The Califorma District Court of Appeal
affirmed a conviction obtained by admitting the evidence. The court said:
"The rationale of the Rochin case was placed squarely upon the ground
that the evidence supporting the defendant's conviction was secured by
methods so brutally shocking as to offend the due process clause. 17
8"Id. at 170.
"Id. at 172.
"Brown v. Massachusetts, 297 U.S. 278 (1935)
"Id. at 173.
"JId. at 170
"III Cal.App.2d 204, 244 P.2d 418 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 880 (1952).
'7 Id. at 215, 244 P.2d at 425.
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People v. Harper8 also involved an unreasonable search and seizure
with the added fact that following his arrest Harper and the police officers en-
gaged in an altercation during which Harper was struck several times. The
District Court of Appeal held that this fact was immaterial in determining
whether the Rochin case applied, since the affray and the procurement of the
evidence were separate, unrelated transactions. It is interesting to speculate
on the attitude of the court had the force been applied in obtaining the evi-
dence. Would this have been "brutal and shocking"?
The Rochin case has been cited in cases involving evidence procured by
wire tapping and wire recorders. In People v. Sica 9 and People v. Irvine40
the District Court of Appeal relied on the Kendall case in refusing to apply
the Rochin case. It held that the lack of any "brutal and shocking" conduct
was fatal to the defendant's argument. Thus, the California courts have lim-
ited the application of the Rochin case to situations involving actual physical
violence in procuring the evidence rather than extending it to apply to cir-
cumstances, not involving physical contact but where the methods of detec-
tion appear to be unjust and dangerous. For example, the use of wire re-
corders or wire tapping is considered by many to pose an intolerable threat
to personal liberties, but under this interpretation the Rochin case cannot
be applied.
The importance of the brutality requirement is clearly illustrated in
People v. Heussler,41 a case involving facts similar to those in the Rochin
case. There one of the questions at the trial was the sobriety of the defendant
at the time of the accident. The prosecution introduced evidence of a blood
test to show intoxication. Mrs. Heussler objected to the admission of the evi-
dence on the ground that the blood had been taken from her person while
she was unconscious in order to give her a transfusion. The trial court over
ruled the objection but the District Court of Appeal reversed,4 2 holding the
evidence inadmissible on the basis of the Rochin case. However, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court refused to follow the extension of the Rochin case to
these facts. In reversing the District Court of Appeal it said:
"Contrary to Mrs. Heussler's contention the Rochin opinion does not
rest upon the premise that the taking of evidence from the person of a defend-
ant or by entry into his body is the decisive factor. Instead the entire course
of conduct was examined and found to be brutal and shocking.... The
taking of a blood test when accomplished in a medically approved manner,
does not smack of brutality."43
:'115 CalApp.2d 776, 252 P.2d 950 (1953).
'112 Cal.App.2d 574,247 P.2d 72 (1952). See People v. Channell, 107 Cal.App.2d 192, 236 P.2d
654 (1951) (Evidence taken by wire tapping in violation of Federal Commnumcations Act is held ad-
missible m a California court though not in a federal court).
4 111 CaLApp.2d 460, 248 P.2d 502 (1952), cert. granted, 345 U.S. 903 (1952).
"See note 25 supra.
"12248 P.2d 434 (1952).1-41 A.C. 256, 263, 260 P.2d 8, 12 (1953).
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Justice Carter dissented on the ground that the court required conduct
that was "brutal and shocking" before applying the Rochin case. He said
that the degree of actual force was not the essence; instead the fact of taking
the blood from an unconscious person, to be used against her at a trial, in
itself violated a fundamental right of such magnitude as to bring it within
the Rochzn case.
Irvine v. California," decided by the United States Supreme Court on
February 8, 1954, when examined with reference to the Wolf, the Rochin
and the Heussler cases, gives a clearer perspective to the role of due process
as a bar to the admission of illegally obtained evidence. Irvine, a resident
of Long Beach, was suspected of violating the gambling laws of California.
In order to confirm their suspicions the police obtained a key to Irvine's
house, and, while he and his wife were absent, entered the house on four
occasions. While there, they set up microphones in various parts of the house
and used them to pick up conversations by the suspect. Subsequently Irvine
was arrested, tried and convicted of bookmaking on evidence so obtained.
The District Court " sustained the conviction and rejected the contention
that the Rochzn case should apply to exclude the evidence.
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the conviction in a
five to four decision. The majority relied upon Wolf v. Colorado46 as declara-
tive of the general rule that the admission of evidence in a state court, though
a violation of the federal rule, was not repugnant to the due process clause.
The Court then considered the Rochzn case and held that it did not apply.
It said.
[the Rochin case] presented an element totally lacking here-
coercion . . applied by a physical assault upon his person to compel sub-
mission to the use of the stomach pump. . . This was the feature which led
to a result in Rochu contrary to that in Wolf. However obnoxious are the
facts in the case before us, they do not involve coercion, violence or brutality
to the person, but rather, a trespass to property, plus eavesdropping." 47
The Court expressly rejected the broad interpretation of the Rochin
case proposed by counsel for Irvine, viz. that wherever the act of obtaining
evidence for the state shocked the minds of the judges to a sufficient degree,
a conviction thereby obtained should be reversed. "A distinction of the kind
urged would leave the rule so indefinite that no state court could know what
it should rule in order to keep its processes on solid constitutional grounds.
48
Justice Frankfurter, the author of the majority opinions in the Wolf
and Rochin cases, wrote a dissenting opinion. He argues that the majority
"74 Sup.Ct. 381 (1951)
"See note 40 supra.
"See note 27, supra.
"Id. at 383.
"Id. at 384.
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had overlooked the essence of due process by attempting to reduce it to a
formula based on the facts of the Rochin case. "Surely the court does not
propose to announce a new absolute, namely that even the most reprehen-
sible means of securing a conviction will not taint the verdict so long as the
body of the accused was not touched by state officials. . . . "" To Justice
Frankfurter it is not the form but the substance of the wrongdoing that is
the determining factor. No matter how they are carried out the issue is wheth-
er the acts of the police in obtaining the evidence offend "civilized standards
of decency and fairness." These standards, he said, can not be captured at
any given point of time, but are to be set down by the judgment of the court
with reference to the facts and surrounding circumstances of each case. "The
effort to imprison due process within tidy categories misconceives its nature
and is a futile endeavor to save the judicial function from the pains of ju-
dicial judgment." 0 Justice Frankfurter then stated that the facts justified
the application of the Rochzn rule. He concluded: "There is lacking here
physical violence, even to the restricted extent employed in the Rochin case.
We have here, however, a more powerful and offensive control over . . .
Irvine's life than a single, limited trespass."51
Summary.
The law in California is well settled that any illegality in the procure-
ment of evidence is immaterial to its admissibility unless the presence of
certain conduct brings it within the "brutal and shocking" rule of the Rochzn
case. However, this rule has been so narrowly restricted by the California
courts that it has made no substantial change in the previously accepted law.
In view of the consistency of California decisions from 1896 to 1954 any
major alterations in this law should be made by the legislature and not the
courts. With this in mind Justice Carter of the California Supreme Court has
proposed that the California legislature enact the following statute:
"No evidence obtained in violation of Article I, Section 19 of the Con-
stitution or any law of the State of California shall ever be introduced or
admitted or used for any purpose whatsoever in any court of this state."52
"Id. at 390.
5Id. at 391.
"See note 49 supra.
"People v. Rochin, supra note 26.
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